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WSURANCB-SUBROGA'IlON-lliGHT OF INSURED TO RECOVER ON AN AUTOMOBILE "CoLLISION" POLICY AFTER FULL SETTLEMENT WITH THE NEGLIGENT

WnoNGDOBR-Respondent, whose automobile was covered by a policy 0£ "collision"
insurance in appellant insurance company, suffered serious personal injuries and
complete loss 0£ his car as a result 0£ a collision with an oil company truck. Despite
numerous telephone calls, appellant £ailed to settle for the cash value 0£ the automobile, as required by the insurance contract. In the meantime, respondent·
brought an action against the oil company, joining the claims for personal injury
and property damage, and executed a £ull release to that company in return for a
settlement 0£ $20,000. He then brought this action for actual damages to the automobile on the theory that appellant fraudulently breached its contract, knowing
that respondent had to claim all elements 0£ damage in the oil company suit.1Appellant defended on the ground that respondent's release destroyed appellant's right 0£
subrogation and discharged appellant's contractual liability. Held, appellant, by
its conduct in £ailing to pay the loss when reported, waived all subrogation rights.
The verdict 0£ the jury in the present action was for $400 less than the value 0£
the automobile and that sum represented a reasonable proportion o£ the $20,000
settlement allocable to the car loss. Powersy. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., (S.C. 1950)

57 S.E. (2d) 638.
Subrogation is the equitable right, acquired by an insurer upon the voluntary
payment 0£ a sum of money for which it is only secondarily liable, to pursue the
remedies 0£ the insured against a third person wrongdoer.2 In automobile insurance cases, the insurer may usually abrogate its contract i£ the insured releases the
tort-£easor prior to payment, thus destroying the insurer's possible subrogation
rights; or it may recoup payments made to an insured who subsequently releases

1 Holcombe v. Garland & Denwiddie, Inc., 162
2 Billings, "The Significance of Subrogation in

lNs. L.J. 707, 708 (1948).

S.C. 379, 160 S.E. 881 (1931).
Automobile Insurance Practice," 308
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the wrongdoer. 3 Because it is an equitable right, however, subrogation will or
will not be enforced "according to the dictates of equity and good conscience,"4
and the right may be abandoned or waived by conduct, in which case the insurer
may be estopped from defending an action on the ground that the insured has
settled with and released the wrongdoer. 5 In the principal case, the appellant's
failure seasonably to settle the claim6 placed the respondent in a very disadvantageous position. The law required him to sue upon his personal injuries and
property damage in one action or lose the omitted claim. Either way, judgment
or settlement would release the negligent wrongdoer and give the insurer a basis
for claiming a defense to a subsequent action against it The chances were that
any property damages awarded by a jury,, against the oil company, would not be
so large as the amount properly collectible from the insurance .company. ''The
remedy for the apparent dilemma lay in the appellant's hands. It could have paid
the loss, as it was obligated under its policy, and preserved its right of subrogation."7 On these facts, it is submitted that the court in the principal case reached
the only logical result. It answered appellant's claim that r~ondent was gaining
double compensation for his loss by allowing the jury to determine that proportion
of the oil company settlement properly allocable to the property damage. While
this undoubtedly involved a great deal of "second guessing" by the jury, the
appellant created the situation in the first instance and can hardly be heard to
complain.8 Insurance company attorneys have long argued that a liberalization
3 Id. at 708. See, also, 6 APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE §4093 (1942);
8 CoucH, CYc. 011 lNsURANCE LAW §§2001-2003 (1931); RICHARDS, LAw 011 INsURANcE,
4th ed., §57 (1932); VANCE, LAw 011 INsURANCE, 2d ed., 675 (1930) and 14 A.L.R. 192
(1921) supplemented by 26 A.L.R. 431 (1923) and 54 A.L.R. 1458 (1928). Some authority
holds that an insured's rights are not barred by a settlement with the tort-feasor for less than
the liability, such settlement being available to the insurer only as a defense pro tanto to
the extent of the amount paid. Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Wells, 84 N.J.Eq. 484, 94 A.
619 (1915).
4 46 C.J.S., Insurance §1209 (1946).
5 16 APPLBMAN, INsURANcE LAw AND PRACTICE §9088 (1944); 73 U.S. L. REv. 301,
302 (1939); Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Schellenger, 84 N.J. Eq. 464, 94 A. 615 (1915);
Leonard v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411, 245 N.W. 849 (1932); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Thomas, 49 Ga. App. 731, 176 S.E. 690 (1934); Everett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
129 Neb. 386, 261 N.W. 575 (1935); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga.
621, 183 S.E. 799 (1935) and Weber v. United Hardware and Implement Mutuals Co.,
75 N.D. 581, 31 N.W. (2d) 456 (1948). If the acts relied on for waiver are those of an
agent, it must expressly appear he was authorized to act. 8 CoucH, CYc. 011 INsURANCE LAw
§2035 (1931).
·
6 The insurer must be given a reasonable amount of time in which to investigate and
pay a loss. 14 A.L.R. 193 (1921) and cases cited; SrMPSON, THE LAw RELATING TO AUTOMOBILE INsURANcE, 2d ed., §185 (1928).
7 Principal case at 641. Where an insurer pays a loss and sues the tort-feasor, the
latter cannot set up the insured's recovery in a personal injury action as a defense since the
insured no longer had a cause of action for property damage. That had passed to the insurer.
See 14 A.L.R. 192 (1921).
8 Where an insurer has already paid a claim ·and the insured then sues the tort-feasor
for personal injuries, the insurer joining in the action, Minnesota requires the insurer to
ask the jury for a special finding on what portion of the verdict constitutes recovery for
property damage. See 42 CoL. L. REv. 1368 (1942). There is some little authority for
the solution adopted in the principal case. See Sun Ins. Office v. Hohenstein, 128 Misc. 870,
220 N.Y.S. 386 (1927). These subrogation defenses seldom arise, at least where small
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of subrogation rules, in favor of insurers, might beneficially result in substantial
savings to the insuring public by helping to reduce high premium rates,9 but
several surveys have shown that any recovery by an insurer on a subrogated claim
is unexpected, and that "collision" insurance premiums are calculated on an
indemnity basis, regardless of insured's freedom from fault 10

Robert W. Shadd, S.Ed.

amounts are involved, probably because the insurance companies fear adverse publicity and,
in addition, realize the improbability oE their winning jury cases.
9 Billings, "The Signi6.cance of Subrogation in Automobile Insurance Practice," 308
INs. L.J. 707, 714 (1948) and 4 CAN. BARR.Ev. 713 (1926).
10 CnoBoucH AND Rm>»ING, CASUALTY INstJRANCB 309 (1928); 42 CoL. L. REv.
1368 (1942).

